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No single discipline can lay claim to ‘owning’ the paradigm that is mental health. Attempts 
to do so have provoked resistance and debate for centuries. Cicero (106–43 BCE) rejected 
Hippocrates’s earlier theories of imbalanced bodily fluids (‘humours’) to posit that low mood 
was related to emotions. Later, in the Middle Ages, monks displaced these ideas in favour of 
humour-rebalancing bloodletting, whilst using prayer and dogma to promote well-being. In fact, 
the way emotional distress is understood tends to evolve in line with the cultural ideas of the 
day. So as science became more influential in society, then a scientific understanding of mental 
ill health naturally followed.
The medical model
The biological model of mental ill health is often described as the ‘medical model’ (see Chap-
ter 6). It is a mistake to consider this a single entity as within it live many dynamic traditions. 
The neurologist, for example, might have one conceptualization, whilst a geneticist would have 
another. What they share is the underlying positivistic view that mental illness is a phenomenon 
(that is, it is something real that can be observed) and that the cause – and therefore cure – lies in 
the biology of the human body. Since the 1950s, the dominant model of mental disease in indus-
trialized states has been related to the action of chemicals that affect the central nervous system. 
The dysfunction of these ‘neurotransmitter’ systems is hypothesized to lead to specific and cat-
egorizable signs and symptoms that have been clustered into diagnostic categories, codified inter-
nationally in the International Classification of Disease (ICD; World Health Organization, 1993) and 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). These publications have become hugely influential and have had far-reaching effects.
The cutting edge of this science is now moving beyond the neurochemical theory and is 
exploring novel fields, such as quantum biology. Here, researchers theorize that the components 
of individual cell elements (such as the microtubule cytoskeleton) affect the actions of individual 
molecules in ways that manifest on a gross level as the specific and observable symptoms of 
diagnostic taxonomies (see Gardiner, 2017, for further discussion).
The diagnostic tradition that guides psychiatric medicine has, however, proved problematic. 
There are many criticisms that can be made here, one of which is that unlike their colleagues 
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in physical medicine, psychiatrists take for granted the phenomena they are observing but have 
little objective evidence that it independently exists (Szasz, 1961). Szasz, along with other crit-
ics such as Laing (1965), challenged the orthodoxy of psychiatry in an attempt to humanize its 
practice but, overall, have had little impact on the profession itself. They have, however, inspired 
indirect developments such as user movements and given rise to the legitimacy of criticism.
Making a diagnosis requires belief in the validity of a social construct that cites distress as a 
sign of pathology. The labelling of various symptoms into a disease is, at face value, attractive. It 
reduces complex behaviour into a single explanatory framework: mental illness. Critics of this 
approach disagree. They would argue that diagnoses are over-reliant on subjective symptoms, 
with no recourse to observable signs. This leads to unreliability, bias and misinterpretation. The 
bias introduced by sociocultural and political norms negates, on the whole, the social and psy-
chological impacts of inequality, oppression and exploitation and has the side effect of making 
the individual somehow responsible for their condition (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010).
There are also arguments about the self-referential nature of psychiatric medicine. In the lat-
ter part of the 20th century, the diagnostic tradition in psychiatry has been seen as tautological, 
in that it uses symptoms typically found in a patient group to diagnose a person as being part of 
that group, with no independent criteria for inferring the condition in the first place (Bentall, 
1990). This reification of ideas is circular, and the notion of mental illness being an objectively 
verifiable disease process continues to be hotly debated.
Diagnoses are also not free of social value. They are generally stigmatizing and can remove 
hope and construct in the minds of professionals and the public alike notions of dangerous and 
manipulative individuals who are both untreatable and responsible for their condition (see Chap-
ter 26). Such conceptualizations have been unhelpful and are part of the explanation for low 
levels of social recovery and inclusion for those labelled in such ways (Perkins & Repper, 2013).
Challenge is however being generated internally. Authors such as Bracken and Thomas 
(2005) critiqued the psychiatric profession as being unable to see past its institutional origins to 
view a future that is free of the unhelpful elements of its historical legacy. Their ‘postpsychiatry’ 
agenda cites a profession committed to moving to contextualized, ethical and less coercive prac-
tices. This emancipatory approach continues to be globally disseminated through international 
organizations such as the Critical Psychiatry Network and Hearing Voices Network.
The psychological model
The dominant position of medicine in the field of psychiatric care has also been challenged by 
the psychological movement. Sharing some of the positivistic characteristics of medicine, psy-
chology has long posited a range of alternative theories of mental ill health, some of which are 
directly opposed to the dominant model. These models place at their core the primacy of per-
ception and the processes of thinking. Several distinct traditions, such as cognitive behavioural 
therapy (see Chapter 16), have evolved, many of which have become the treatment of choice for 
a range of mental disorders and are often used in complex casework where often the evidence 
base for pharmaceutical interventions is lacking (National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence [NICE], 2009).
Looking towards the future of psychology, the publication of The Power Threat Meaning 
Framework (Johnstone et al., 2018) has been set out as a viable alternative to psychiatric diagno-
sis. It is intended to address many of the single-paradigm issues addressed above. It is theorized 
within the model that this approach will bring together the social, biological and psychological 
elements of experience that together produce the phenomena of distress. One way in which it 
diverges from a medical approach is that it views biology as a mediating rather than causal factor.
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Psychological approaches are, however, open to criticism. There are again tautological con-
cerns that psychological explanations are often self-referential. Critics also believe psychologi-
cal approaches define how people should present through their concordance with established 
models, which problematizes diversity (Grant, 2011). Some authors have also noted that these 
approaches do not contextualize the person into their ecosystem, and therefore, their symptoms 
have no context. This leads to what Smail (2004) calls ‘interiorization’. This occurs when the 
effects of real-world problems, such as abuse or poverty, are turned into problems of internal 
perception or process. This form of neo-Cartesian thinking, where the mind is independent 
from the world it inhabits, leads to responsibilizing the individual for their distress. This raises 
issues for practitioners following the anti-oppressive base of social work.
Recovery in psychology is often measured by changes in scores on validated rating scales. 
This is problematic in that it is an arbitrary set of values that decides if someone has recovered 
or not and ignores the subjective experience. ‘Recovery’ and ‘distress’ are professionally defined 
and quantified. Rather than reflect the subjective reality of emotional distress, approaches using 
such methods construct distress and recovery in ways that become scientifically plausible and 
dominant. But, as Grant (2011, p. 38) reminds us: ‘The textual portrayal of human suffering is 
never neutral, in that the politics of representation inform the struggle over the definition and 
experience of selfhood’. The power of psychiatric and psychological labels are both far-reaching 
and potentially harmful (see Goffman, 1963), especially when used in a reductionist manner to 
redefine well-being in terms of rating scale scores.
Social factors
Neither the psychological nor the medical approaches truly manage to incorporate the real 
worlds that people live in. Industrialized countries have struggled to value and provide appro-
priate care for those considered mentally ill. Within the field of physical health, there is a 
well-recorded phenomenon that people who experience mental health problems have worse 
outcomes in terms of physical health. Once help is sought, they also receive sub-standard levels 
of care for a range of common but serious medical conditions (Bressington et al., 2018). Many of 
these conditions are easily treatable, but due to sub-optimal service, a person with schizophrenia 
can expect to lose 14.5 years of life when compared to a peer without the condition (Hjorthøj, 
Stürup, McGrath, & Nordentoft, 2017). These numbers are very significant and clearly present 
as a matter of social justice. Within the UK, these issues are believed to arise in part from a lack 
of ‘parity of esteem’ between physical and mental health services. Such structural and cultural 
inequalities are not easily addressed, and within the UK, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
is being used as a legal remedy. The fact that legal avenues are needed, however, says a great deal 
about the social positioning within a society of those with mental health problems.
Authors such as Marmot (2010) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have also established that 
adverse social conditions, such as poverty and poor housing, can have a deleterious effect on 
physical and mental health. There are also strong links between social disadvantage and exclu-
sion. Labonte (2004) provides a useful formulation of exclusion as the result of social processes, 
which differs perhaps from a currently more dominant neoliberal perspective of exclusion relat-
ing to a failure of the individual to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a market 
economy. Indeed, van der Wel, Saltkjel, Chen, Dahl, and Halvorsen (2018) show that the current 
wave of European ‘austerity’ policies increases health inequalities with an association that grows 
over time, which further undermines the neoliberal argument of personal or moral failure.
There is a general tendency for unequal social systems to become self-perpetuating, and in 
socio-economic terms, these can often be characterized by racial groupings (Galabuzi & Labonte, 
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2002). Unequal societies tend to have higher rates of social and emotional problems than those 
that are more equal (Marmot & Wilkinson, 2006), and inequalities are strongly linked to poor 
mental health (Allen, Balfour, Bell, & Marmot, 2014). For many social workers, their daily work 
involves either helping to change unjust systems or helping people live with the effects of them. 
Part of these roles may be to facilitate the inclusion of those excluded into areas of society that 
are currently closed to them. Such areas may include better housing, employment and social 
contacts. In this sense, social work in mental health is always a political activity as social inclusion 
is an act of political will on behalf of the dominant groups. Of course, this approach needs to 
be used with care as sometimes the opening of opportunities results in little more than further 
exploitation of citizens if driven by market rather than humanitarian concerns.
Risk
Concepts of risk assessment and management have become integral to mental health practice. 
Many authors have noted how the issue of risk has become more prominent in recent years, 
driven by discourses around society’s perception and expectations of risk. Beck (1992), most 
notably, described the ‘risk society’ which reflected this growing trend more widely. In mental 
health practice, Tew (2011) refers to the emergence of those with mental health problems as 
objects of risk despite the lack of actuarial evidence to support this. He points to the pathology 
of the individual as a dominant narrative, whereby dangerousness, and consequently blame, are 
placed within the individual service user, whilst contributing social factors are ignored. This 
may help explain the international phenomena whereby people with mental health problems 
are more likely to be victims of violence than perpetrators (Sin, Hedges, Cook, Mguni, & 
Comber, 2009).
People with mental health problems have become particularly vulnerable to pejorative 
media representations, with disproportionate media coverage. The resultant focus on the risk 
of violence by those with mental health problems is a key theme underpinning the discrimina-
tion they face (Sayce, 2016). This in turn has influenced the practice discourse of professionals 
involved in mental health care, with growing emphasis on safeguarding and risk management 
rather than need (Kemshall, 2014).
The difficulty of risk prediction is widely recognized, particularly for the high profile, though 
statistically rare, incidents of homicide (Szmukler, Daw, & Dawson, 2010) and also for the more 
frequent incidents of suicide (Heller, 2017). The concepts of false positives and negatives (see 
Szmukler et al., 2010) provide a useful theoretical model for conceptualizing the arena of 
 decision-making by mental health professionals, including the significant ethical implications 
inherent within this. Crawford (2000, p. 152) provides an example here, citing that to prevent 
a single homicide by someone diagnosed with schizophrenia would require the detention of 
approximately 5,000 similarly diagnosed individuals who would not have committed this crime.
Social work practitioners face the challenge of working within agency guidelines which no 
doubt have risk prevention and management at the forefront, whilst striving to challenge any 
unnecessary or discriminatory emphasis on risk. This is often done within a legal framework.
Legislation
A key feature, therefore, of mental health practice is the role legislation plays in shaping services 
and intervention. Mental health is differentiated from general medicine through its use of treat-
ment enforced via legislation, a course of action used by the majority of developed countries, 
though their methods of implementation differ (Tew, 2011). It is instructive to examine the 
Peter Benbow and Paul Blakeman
418
theoretical drivers which underpin such intervention, particularly for social workers where, as 
Johns points out, ‘the very idea of coercion in social care seems contradictory, and, to many, even 
abhorrent’ (Johns, in Boylan & Brammer, 2017, p. 59)
Authors such as Bean (1986) and Rogers and Pilgrim (2010) have pointed to the use of men-
tal health law as a method of social control with roots in capitalism’s desire to maintain stability 
and economic development. A libertarian model (Sayce, 2016) argues that the legal distinction 
between physical and mental health is unethical, illogical and driven largely by discriminatory 
and stigmatizing perspectives of the mentally unwell, as well as consequently perpetuating such 
perspectives. A model proposed by Szmukler (2010) is for the removal of separate mental health 
legislation, replacing it with a single statute based solely on capacity rather than diagnosis or 
notions of risk. This would apply to everyone, not just those with a diagnosed mental disorder 
or impairment.
In the UK, for example, the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 saw a strengthen-
ing of the trend toward rights-based legislation. It defines how capacity is assessed and aims to 
protect those people who lack capacity to make decisions for themselves. Whilst strengthening 
the right of a capacitous person to refuse treatment for physical health problems, treatment for 
mental disorders can still be imposed via the Mental Health Act, even where a person has the 
capacity to object.
Social workers increasingly find their work shaped by statutory roles in adults practice 
(Lilo & Vose, 2016). Within the Mental Health Act, approved mental health professionals, a role 
still predominantly undertaken by social workers in the UK, act as an important counterweight 
to the medical perspective at the point of assessment, with a duty to promote a social perspec-
tive and service user rights. The act is founded on a medical framework of mental disorder and 
treatment which has remained essentially unchanged for several decades. By its very nature, 
then, this is a challenging and potentially ethically compromising role (Kinney, 2009). Pilgrim 
(in Matthews, O’Hare, & Hemmington, 2014) draws on concepts from Bourdieu to offer prac-
titioners a practice model through which to explore how they carry out such statutory roles, in 
particular questioning the accepted assumptions that operate throughout mental health provi-
sion (see also Chapters 5 and 12). Assumptions, or ‘doxa’, such as ‘people with mental health 
problems need help’ and that the provision of such help is in their ‘interests’ are, as noted earlier, 
open to theoretical challenge but remain embedded as accepted and integral elements of British 
mental health policy and legislation. Furthermore, social workers are influenced by a process 
of ‘secondary socialization’: for example, through their training, which frames their disposition 
more broadly and shapes what they perceive as ‘good’ practice. Social workers may be vulnerable 
to becoming assimilated into medical discourses as a result of their organizational arrangements 
(Nathan & Webber, 2010). The challenge for the mental health social worker is to maintain an 
independent, socially orientated perspective whilst working effectively alongside their medical 
colleagues.
A recent area of development has been how theories underpinning mental health legislation 
have been exported to the community setting through the introduction of involuntary treat-
ment in the community, known as community treatment orders in the UK. Those in support 
of this development point to the high number of ‘revolving door patients’ who could be spared 
repeated compulsory detention through enforcing their treatment in the community. Enforced 
treatment at home is less draconian than that taking place in hospital and thus promoted the 
‘least restrictive’ principle of the MHA. Subsequent studies in the UK and other countries have 
called into question the efficacy of these measures. Two issues emerge: community treatment 
orders have not reduced hospital admissions as anticipated (Burns et al., 2013; Maughan et al., 
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2014; Rugkasa, 2016), and certain groups are disproportionately represented, the most clear 
example being ‘Black or Black British’ people who were almost nine times more likely to being 
made subject to them (NHS Digital, 2017).
Recovery
Although it can be argued that several traditions lay claim to the exclusive right to define and 
portray distress and recovery in their own terms, approaches based on more value-based meth-
ods attempt to avoid such difficulties.
Approaches using what are known as ‘recovery values’ are gaining increasing traction. Such 
approaches aim to deliver the lifestyle that is defined by the service user, not the service provid-
ers, and one that is not judged by compliance and rating scales. Models using recovery values 
have been postulated (e.g. Spaniol, Wewiorski, Gagne, & Anthony, 2002; Andresen, Oades, & 
Caputi, 2003), although it is stressed that every individual’s journey will be unique to them. 
Such approaches share much in common with the social model of disability (Oliver, 1996; see 
Chapter 38), in that the societal response to symptoms can be more limiting than the symptoms 
themselves, so care is taken to challenge discrimination and provide education where needed.
The aim of the recovery values approach is to deliver a life that is self-defined, hopeful and 
meaningful. This approach also facilitates spiritual understandings of experience, which other 
models do not. The notion of ‘cure’ is somewhat a side issue as the focus is on developing a 
personally significant life rather than symptom reduction (Byrne, Schoeppe, & Bradshaw, 2018). 
The two are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Despite its popularity, there remains inconsist-
ency in the use of the term ‘recovery’, and its definition has changed over time (Ellison, Bel-
anger, Niles, Evans, & Bauer, 2018). Studies have looked to identify core elements (e.g. Slade 
et al., 2017; Ellison et al., 2018). Whilst it is recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity 
across these studies, themes of hope, identity, opportunity and empowerment frequently appear. 
The issue of risk appears with regularity, with the recovery model inherently linked to a more 
therapeutic approach to working with perceived risk, encouraging individuals to take a greater 
stake in the risks they are exposed to and developing capabilities to manage them rather than 
being protected from them (Morgan, Felton, Fulford, Kalathil, & Stacey, 2016).
A critique of the recovery model has, perhaps naturally, emerged as it has become more 
embedded in government policies. Approaches using recovery values have seemed to falter 
when encountering highly organized health and social care providers, where the dominance 
of the medical model, coupled with organizational responsibilities in terms of financial and 
legal constraints, appear to hamper the effective adoption (Miller, Stanhope, Restrepo-Toro, & 
Tondora, 2017). As noted above, lack of clarity over the underlying definition and philosophy 
of recovery mean it has risked becoming a ‘catch-all’ term, meaning different things to dif-
ferent people. It has come under criticism for its primarily individualistic focus, whereby the 
service user is expected to develop a new way of being to manage their condition. This reflects 
current neoliberal discourse, whereby the state passes responsibility for well-being and regula-
tion of behaviour on to the individual (Morgan et al., 2016). This, of course, jars somewhat 
when ‘risk’ becomes pre-eminent, and the neoliberal model melts into a paternalistic model 
of practice, where statutory tools (such as involuntary detention) are often applied. Indeed, it 
would appear that reconciling risk management with recovery-based approaches is challenging, 
although authors such as Felton and Stickley (2018) believe that it can be done through narra-
tive approaches. These provide a context in which risk can be understood and how individual 
strengths, control and collaboration can be used to mitigate harm.
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Structural factors which may have contributed to the development of an individual’s men-
tal distress, or indeed may serve to aid their recovery from it, are thus relegated, and the link 
between mental distress and social injustice is lost (Harper & Speed, 2012). There are further 
challenges with low levels of staff and user knowledge regarding implementing the phases or 
stages of recovery and the difficulties in designing valid measurement tools to assess its effective-
ness (Slade et al., 2017).
Conclusion: bringing it all together
For the practising social worker, the field of mental health is contested and complex, with many 
areas of intersectionality. Whilst the authors are not inherently opposed to psychiatric or psy-
chological approaches to mental health, we would assert that the predominance of these two 
models in particular limits the opportunities for social approaches to be used in routine practice. 
This is further compounded by the emphasis on risk and risk management, which is codified in 
many legislative frameworks. This also reflects a wider societal preoccupation with the perceived 
threat posed by mental health service users and the need for agencies to demonstrate their 
accountability and effectiveness in addressing these concerns.
Interventions based on recovery values have established themselves as a credible and viable 
addition to the field of mental health. In this sense, recovery requires statutory agencies to per-
sonalize and democratize the therapeutic process. It also requires cultural as well as technical 
shifts in work patterns that challenge structural and power-related barriers. The reality of prac-
tice requires workers to be able to successfully navigate complex social, political and cultural –
currents that are frequently antithetical to each other – a role well suited to social workers due 
to the breadth and depth of their professional knowledge.
Practitioners familiar with personalization and critical practice may find themselves drawn to 
recovery-based approaches, although they may also find them practically challenging to imple-
ment. That said, social workers remain the professional group most likely to embrace recovery-
orientated practice with fidelity and have an opportunity to reshape the international landscape 
of mental healthcare to better reflect the needs of those experiencing distress.
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